University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications
Summer 1994

Doing Environmental Justice in Appalachia: Lawyers at the
Grassroots and the Aspiration of Social Change
Dean Rivkin

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

DATE DOWNLOADED: Mon Mar 14 12:10:05 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Dean Hill Rivkin, Doing Environmental Justice in Appalachia: Lawyers at the
Grassroots and the Aspiration of Social Change, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1109 (1994).
ALWD 7th ed.
Dean Hill Rivkin, Doing Environmental Justice in Appalachia: Lawyers at the
Grassroots and the Aspiration of Social Change, 96 W. Va. L. Rev. 1109 (1994).
APA 7th ed.
Rivkin, D. (1994). Doing environmental justice in appalachia: lawyers at the
grassroots and the aspiration of social change. West Virginia Law Review, 96(4),
1109-1116.
Chicago 17th ed.
Dean Hill Rivkin, "Doing Environmental Justice in Appalachia: Lawyers at the
Grassroots and the Aspiration of Social Change," West Virginia Law Review 96, no. 4
(Summer 1994): 1109-1116
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Dean Hill Rivkin, "Doing Environmental Justice in Appalachia: Lawyers at the
Grassroots and the Aspiration of Social Change" (1994) 96:4 W Va L Rev 1109.
AGLC 4th ed.
Dean Hill Rivkin, 'Doing Environmental Justice in Appalachia: Lawyers at the
Grassroots and the Aspiration of Social Change' (1994) 96(4) West Virginia Law Review
1109
MLA 9th ed.
Rivkin, Dean Hill. "Doing Environmental Justice in Appalachia: Lawyers at the
Grassroots and the Aspiration of Social Change." West Virginia Law Review, vol. 96,
no. 4, Summer 1994, pp. 1109-1116. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Dean Hill Rivkin, 'Doing Environmental Justice in Appalachia: Lawyers at the
Grassroots and the Aspiration of Social Change' (1994) 96 W Va L Rev 1109
Provided by:
University of Tennessee College of Law Joel A. Katz Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

DOING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
IN APPALACHIA: LAWYERS AT THE GRASSROOTS
AND THE ASPIRATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE
DEAN HILL RivKiN*

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when progressive lawyers
and communities first linked up in Appalachia, we didn't call it environmental justice. In representing citizens and their organizations (we
always called them organizations, not groups-it sounded more official) in environmental cases in the mountains of Appalachia, the struggles had to do more with elemental precepts of power and self-determination than with the environment or justice.' The "petty disturbances" that these cases represented were anything but petty to the people
involved.2 Doing environmental justice in the coal fields brought lawyers, people, and organizations together in uncharted ways.
In 1972, I was a Regionald Heber Smith Community Lawyer
Fellow (Reggie) working with the Appalachian Research and Defense
Fund (Appalred), a then OEO-funded legal services program It didn't
take much sensitivity on the part of community lawyers to see that
poverty in the mountains was inextricably connected to exploitation of

* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee, College of Law. This essay is dedicated to my mentor, John Rosenberg, Director of Appalachian Research and Defense Fund of
Kentucky, Inc., who has imbued a generation (or two) of lawyers with broad horizons about
law, lawyers, and communities.
1. See JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN
AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980).
2. Professor Roberto Unger used the phrase "petty disturbances" to describe cases
brought by people and communities against the prevailing order. See Roberto Mangabeira
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 667 (1983). The term
is problematic because it can be read to diminish the importance of local struggles to the
people who wage them.
3. The origins of Appalred are documented in MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND
THE LAW 16-24 (1993).
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the region's coal resources. But recognizing this underlying phenomenon and "lawing" against it were two different things.
We turned to the indigenous citizens organizations that were
forming throughout the central coal fields-The Citizens League To
Protect Surface Rights, The Appalachian Group To Save The Land
And The People, Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. (SOCM), and
others-to chart our course.4 Abolishing strip mining was a universal
objective, and we channeled portions of our time toward this goal by
contributing data and legal justifications to the handful of members of
Congress who advocated legislation abolishing strip mining.'
On a less global level, we worked to ameliorate the polycentric
impacts of coal mining on people, communities, and the environment.
Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority6
is a good illustration of these efforts. Having worked in the mountains
of Tennessee as a law student with the Vanderbilt Student Health
Coalition, soon after I arrived at Appalred in 1972 I reacquainted
myself with the people in the coal fields of Northeast Tennessee who
were struggling to improve their communities, including two community organizers and several citizen leaders who had just founded
SOCM.7 In our discussions, the SOCM leadership expressed hope that
with lawyers working for them, the legal system might be used to
vindicate the rights of citizens in confronting the pervasive harms of
coal-mining.

4. The groups and their strategies of protest against strip mining in the 1960s are recounted in Mary Beth Bingman, Stopping the Bulldozers: What Difference Did It Make?, in
FIGHTING BACK IN APPALACHIA: TRADITIONS OF RESISTANCE AND CHANGE 17-30 (Stephen
L. Fisher ed., 1993); see also David B. Brooks, Strip Mining in East Kentucky, in APPALACHIA IN THE SIXTIES: DECADE OF REAWAKENING (David S. Walls & John B. Stephenson
eds., 1972).
5.

See MARC KARNIS LANDY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM: CONTROL-

LING KENTUCKY STRIP MINING (1976).

6. 374 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 926 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974).
7. For a panoramic history of SOCM, see Bill Allen, Save Our Cumberland Mountains: Growth and Change Within a Grassroots Organization, in FIGHTING BACK IN APPALACHIA, supra note 4, at 85-99.
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This belief in lawyers was curious. Lawyers had long been used
to oppress citizens in Appalachia.! But this experience seemed to impress people with the power of the legal system. Consequently, when
lawyers presented themselves to work on behalf of citizens organizations, there was an abiding hope that the legal system could be deployed on the people's behalf.
A problem that emerged as important to the people of SOCM
was the harm caused by overweight coal trucks. In the coal fields of
Tennessee, these trucks carried coal over local highways to one major
source-the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Kingston Steam
Plant, located on the Clinch. River. Like the roads of Italy leading to
Rome, the. roads in East Tennessee seemed to lead to Kingston. A
steady stream of coal trucks exceeding the state-prescribed weight and
axle limits traversed these mostly two-lane highways.9 Overweight,
these trucks left dangerously damaged roads, huge lumps of coal, and
significant costs to each county for highway repair and maintenance.
SOCM wanted to litigate these overweight coal trucks out of
existence. As lawyers, we were operating in terra incognita. I will
never forget attending a Reggie training meeting in 1972 in which all
new Reggies recounted their legal work for the benefit of the group.
Welfare, consumer issues, and housing were the staple caseloads of
most Reggies. Overweight coal trucks stuck out like a sore thumb.
In close consultation with our SOCM clients, a consensus was
reached that we would file a federal action, not against the multiple
firms that.actually carried the coal, but against TVA. From a practical
standpoint, TVA was a logical target. It was the cynosure of coal
activity in east Tennessee.

8. The broadform mineral deed is a notorious example. See RONALD D. ELLER, MINERS, MILLHANDS, AND MOUNTAINEERS: INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE APPALACHIAN SOUTH,
1880-1930 44-85 (1982); Dean Hill Rivkin, Lawyering, Power, and Reform: Litigating
Against the Broadform Mineral Deed in Kentucky (forthcoming).
9. The governing limits were set out in TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1109 and 59-1112
(1972) (current version at §§ 55-7-203 and 55-7-206).
10. See Dean Hill Rivkin, TVA, The Courts, and the Public Interest, in TVA: FIFTY
YEARS OF GRASSROOTS BUREAUCRACY (Paul Conkin & Erwin Hargrove eds., 1983).
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Collecting data for the case was not a daunting task. Our clients helped us obtain TVA weigh records, which documented the
extent and nature of the problem. Our clients also produced a video (a
relatively new strategy in 1972) graphically showing the procession of
overweight coal trucks that entered the Kingston Steam Plant, where
each truck was immediately weighed by TVA on exceptionally precise
scales. At the scales, on an intermittent basis, TVA also probed the
loaded coal for quality. Our clients were certain that coal operators
were selling poor quality coal to TVA, a practice that was going undetected. We did not include this issue in the litigation, primarily because we did not have solid data or theories on which to proceed.
The lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee in Knoxville, home of TVA's headquarters. At the time, our two main legal theories were creative to say the
least. In one, we argued that TVA's acceptance of overweight coal
trucks at its steam plant violated a fundamental principle of federalism;
namely, that a federal agency should not encourage the systematic
violation of state law. To support this contention, we cited a 1958 case
decided by the United States Supreme Court, Tank Truck Rentals, Inc.
v. the Commissioner of Internal Revenue," in which the Court upheld
the disallowance of deductions claimed by taxpayers, who owed a fleet
of motor carriers, for fines and penalties imposed on them for willful
violation of Pennsylvania statutes governing the maximum weight limit
for trucks operated on Pennsylvania's highways. In Tank Truck Rentals, the plaintiff acknowledged that it was taking the calculated risk of
escaping the notice of state's enforcement officials and admitted that
its trucking operations were so hindered by the maximum weight limitations that it could not operate profitably and also observe Pennsylvania law. The Court rejected these contentions by underscoring the
implicitly unequivocal congressional intent not to allow the income tax
laws, as administered and interpreted by the IRS, to be used in a way
that might encourage violation of declared public policy. The rationale
of the Court in Tank Truck Rentals, was directly applicable to our
case:

11.

356 U.S. 30 (1958).
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Here we are concerned with the policy of several states 'evidenced' by

penal statutes enacted to protect their highways from damage and to insure
the safety of all persons using them .

. .

. It is clear that assessment of

the fines was punitive action and not a mere toll for the use of the
highways: the fines occurred only in the exceptional instance when the
overweight run was detected by the police. Petitioner's failure to comply
with the state laws obviously was based on a balancing of the cost of
compliance against the chance of detection. Such a course cannot be sanctioned, for judicial deference to the state action requires, whenever possi-

ble, that a State not be thwarted in its policy. We will not presume that
the Congress, in allowing deductions for income tax purposes, intended to
encourage a business enterprise to violate the declared policy of a State.
To allow the deduction sought here would but encourage continued violations of state law by increasing the odds in favor of noncompliance. This
could only tend to destroy the effectiveness of the State's maximum
weight laws.

The jurisprudence of Tank Truck Rentals seemed to apply directly to
TVA's complicity in the systematic violation of Tennessee's weight
and axle limits.
Our next claim was also ahead of the curve. We contended that
TVA's superficial "final Environmental Impact Statement, Policies
Relating To Sources Of Coal Used By Tennessee Valley Authority For
Electric Power Generation," a skimpy, twelve-page document marked
by superficial discussions of TVA's coal purchasing and use practices,
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). We requested
that TVA be ordered to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) that complied with what we urged NEPA meant.
Our main aim was to enjoin TVA from accepting overweight coal
trucks at its plant. If TVA turned these trucks away, presumably the
trucking companies would not exceed the limits of the law, although
there was some concern that the companies would continue to truck
the coal to a dumping point near the plant, and then carry the coal
into the plant in legal trucks. Regardless, TVA had the means by
which to stop the damage.

12. Id. at 34-35.
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At a hearing on TVA's motion to dismiss, SOCM members were
well represented in the courtroom. So was TVA's legal staff. Despite
our contention that the hearing was also on our motion for a preliminary injunction, we were not permitted to show the video tape or put
on any evidence. The Judge simply heard oral arguments, and, as was
his custom, read his decision from the bench at the conclusion of the
hearing. His order was succinct:
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the Tennessee Valley Authority (T.V.A.) from accepting delivery of coal from private
contractors when tendered in trucks that are overloaded in violation of the
Tennessee weight limitation statute. (citation omited). T.V.A. denies that it
has police or regulatory power over private parties to enforce state statutes.
It contends that it would breach its contract with its term contractors, if it
rejected a tender of delivery on the ground that the delivery truck was
overloaded.
The facts are essentially undisputed. T.V.A. is a wholly-owned corporation of the United States authorized to generate electric power. It contracts with private mine operators for the purchase of coal, f.o.b. Kingston
Steam Plant, in order to generate electric power at that Plant. It weighs the
delivery trucks before and after unloading, and it acknowledges that a
"substantial number" exceed the gross maximum weight permitted under
Tennessee law. None of these term contracts grant T.V.A. an option to
reject delivery in overloaded trucks. It has notified the Governor of Tennessee of these violations of state law.
Plaintiff, J. W. Bradley, lives on Highway 116 over which said trucks
transport coal to the Kingston Steam Plant. He deposes that around one
hundred such trucks pass his house each day "practically all" of which are
overloaded. He further deposes that overloading damages the state and
county roads, resulting in extraordinary wear and tear on private vehicles,
including his own, and creating a safety hazard to local drivers.
The T.V.A.'s motion to dismiss must be sustained. The gravamen of
the complaint is the failure of T.V.A. to enforce a state statute against a
nonparty to this action. The facts alleged do not remotely suggest that
T.V.A. is violating any federal right or immunity. (citation omitted). The
state statute creates both penal and injunctive sanctions to prepenal and
injunctive sanctions to prevent overloading. The Governor of Tennessee is
charged with the responsibility for enforcing state laws, not the T.V.A."3

We appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit. We argued both the
federalism and NEPA claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a brief per
13. 374 F. Supp. at 847.
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curiam decision. As a symbolic gesture, our clients requested that we
file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. As expected, it was denied.
Following SOCM v. TVA, several years elapsed before the organization felt ready to use the legal system again to tackle the issue of
overweight coal trucks. Losing a case has consequences for citizen
organizations-not always adverse. Here, SOCM used the visibility that
it gained in challenging TVA to build its grassroots membership and
to focus on other issues involving strip mining and communities. Finally, in 1977, with representation from lawyers from the East Tennessee
Research Corporation, a small Ford Foundation-funded public interest
law firm (and my continued involvement as a member of the faculty
of the U.T. Legal Clinic), SOCM filed suit under state law seeking to
enjoin several of the largest trucking companies from continuing to
haul coal in illegally overweight trucks.
Remarkably, the Chancellor who heard the case on our motion for
a temporary injunction, whose judicial district was slightly outside the
heart of the coalfields, granted our request. At the same time, the new
leadership at TVA stated it would halt the flow of overweight trucks
into the Kingston Steam Plant. In short order, the issue was resolved,
and SOCM had a victory to bring to its membership. Even more powerful was SOCM's successful effort to defend barratry charges brought
by the trucking companies-an early SLAPP suit. In American Civil
Liberties Union of Tennessee v. Tennessee,14 SOCM joined the ACLU
in a successful challenge to the constitutionality of Tennessee's antiquated barratry statute.
The lessons that lurk in this early tale of environmental justice
raise the same hard questions that the movement is confronting today.
A few deserve mention-their full dimensions are beyond the scope of
this essay. First, there were very few people of color involved with
SOCM in its early years. Demographics and racism ensured that such
was the case. Class and poverty played a powerful role in this Appalachian struggle.

14. 496 F. Supp. 218 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).

1116

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1109

Linking people from Appalachia with their counterparts in communities of color is critically important to the future of the environmental
justice movement. Organizations such as the Highlander Research and
Education Center, through its STP (Stop the Pollution) Workshops,
seek to bring together diverse communities to share their knowledge
about the inner dynamics of environmental justice issues. Through such
interchange, people in Appalachia are able to convey their rich history
with others.
Second, the lawyering that we did in SOCM v. TVA was tangibly
different from the public interest environmental lawyering of its
time. 5 We keenly believed that, as lawyers, we had to be connected
to a strong local effort-with local leaders, spokespersons, and membership. This was hard work. It involved interminable meetings, explanations, and compromises. The work of lawyers in the environmental
justice movement is only beginning to be explicated. 6 We need more
textured accounts of the roles that lawyers can and should play in this
movement.
Finally, the limits of litigation and law in community environmental struggles needs a stronger theoretical base. 7 Through the self-reflection of lawyers and clients in the movement, sound theory should
evolve. Accounts such as this one-in much more expanded
form-should add to the calculus of judgments that lawyers and communities will make in the future.

15. For a history of the litigation conducted by the early public interest environmental
law firms, see Samuel P. Hays, Environmental Litigation in Historical Perspective, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 969 (1986); PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1993).

16. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection:
The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992).
17. See Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from the Field,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1991 (1992).

